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Validity of

the Colorado
Assignment Act
By GRAHAM SUSMAN*
The recent decision of the Colorado Supreme Court in the case of
McKelvey v. Striker, has again given rise to a discussion of the validity
of the Colorado Assignment Act. The court held that a common-law
assignment made to a trustee for the benefit of creditors was void as to
any objecting creditor. Although upholding the right to make a common-law assignment,2 the court held that a judgment creditor, who had
never accepted the offer of the debtor, had a right to pursue any remedy
which he had against the debtor or his property, "just as though no
assignment had been made."
The particular portion of the decision with which we are concerned
in this dictum contained in the opinion:
"Had the debtor proceeded under the statutory assignment act,
the results might have been different."
It will be observed that the court does not definitely say that the
results would have been different, but the implication is present.
While there is no Colorado Supreme Court decision on the exact
point involved, it has been generally felt among lawyers that the statutory assignment act is inoperative, and for that reason the statute has not
been generally invoked. 3 The particular statute now on the books 4 was
adopted in Colorado in 1897, although it was not the first assignment
act in this state. It provides generally for the assignment of debtor's
property to an assignee, who liquidates the same and makes distribution
of the proceeds to creditors. The procedure is somewhat detailed and is
similar to that followed in the federal bankruptcy courts. Section 44 of
the act provides that any person who makes such an assignment "may be
dischargedfrom his debts of every character" by compliance with the act.
This order of discharge becomes binding upon all creditors residing
*Of the Denver Bar.
'Case No. 14832, decided Aug. 25, 1941, and not yet officially reported.
2
Dasnaskus v. McCarty-Johnson Heating Co., 88 Colo. 279, 295 Pac. 490
(1931).
McMullin v. Keough-Doyle Meat Co., 96 Colo. 298, 42 P. (2d) 463

(1935).
'Denver District Court judges have declared the statute suspended. For opinions,
see the cases of In re Paul H. Little, No. 90279; Weisen v. White, No. 93432; and
In re H. W. Bullock, No. A29312.
'COLO. STAT. ANN. (1935) c. 12.
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within the state and all outside creditors who have appeared and participated in the proceedings or who have received and accepted a dividend.
This section makes it a bankruptcy act. Our court stated in the
case of Clark v. Bright:'
"The assignment act is, in effect, a bankruptcy act. It was
passed by our legislature a short time before the congressional act
and its purpose is to enable an insolvent debtor by conveying his
property to an assignee for the benefit of creditors, to be discharged
from his debts. * * * The general scope and purpose of our law is
to dischargea debtor from his debts upon complying with the law."
(Italics ours.)
The Constitution of the United States6 gives Congress the power to
establish uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcies throughout the
United States. Under this power, Congress has acted four times. 7 The
law now in effect was enacted July 1, 1898, and with some amendments
is the one now in force. This act, of course, provides for the discharge
of the provable debts of the debtor.
We now have a situation in Colorado wherein there are two bankruptcy statutes in force, the federal and state. As already pointed out,
the state statute has been declared by our court to be a bankruptcy act,8
and has been in effect since 1897; the federal statute since 1898. It is
generally held that when Congress has power to legislate upon a subject,
but fails to do so, the individual states may so legislate. But when Congress has spoken, the question arises whether the state act thereby becomes
void, or is suspended, or held in abeyance, or whether both may act
concurrently on the same subject-matter."
In the decisions and among the text-writers, a marked distinction is
made between state statutes which are general insolvency statutes, which
provide for the discharge of the debtor and are therefore, in effect, bankruptcy statutes, and those which merely permit and regulate general
assignments for the benefit of creditors. Our statute is of the former type.
The earlier decisions held that the assignment of a debtor under the
30 Colo. 199, 69 Pac. 506 (1902).
IV, §8.
'The first act was passed April 4, 1800, and repealed Dec. 19, 1803. It made no
provision for voluntary bankruptcy and was applicable only to merchants, traders and
bankers. The second law was enacted Aug. 19, 1841, due to the panic of 1837, and
was repealed March 3, 1843. This act provided for both voluntary and involuntary
bankruptcy and was broader in its provisions than the act of 1800. The third act was
passed March 2, 1867, and repealed Sept. 1, 1878. The law now in force was enacted
July 1, 1898, and was amended in some particulars by several supplementary acts
(1903, 1906, 1910, and 1938).
8
Clark v. Bright, supra, note 5.
'See Routt County v. Denver t4 S. L. R. R. Cq,,, 88 Colo. 14, 291 Pac. 1020
(1930).

'ART.
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state act was merely an act of bankruptcy which would give creditors a
right to file an involuntary petition in bankruptcy. Other cases held
that the state act was not suspended or superseded unless the federal statute was invoked either by a voluntary or involuntary petition in bankruptcy. Typical of such decisions is that of Jensern-King-Bird Co. v.
Williams, 0 a Washington case, in which the state statute was likewise
adopted prior to 1898. The court said:
"So that it will be seen that the vital question to be determined
in this case is whether or not the bankruptcy law which was passed
by Congress * * * supersedes or suspends the state insolvency law
which was in existence at the time of the passage of said bankruptcy
act. There is some conflict of judicial decisions on this question,
but it was decided by this court * * * that the enactment of the
Federal Bankruptcy law of July 1, 1898, did not suspend the jurisdiction of state courts in insolvency cases, where there had beer no
proceeding instituted respecting the matter in controversy." (Italics
ours.)

In Shaw v. Standard Piano Company," counsel argued that since
both laws operate upon the same subject-matter, namely, the assets of the
corporation, and the same persons, namely, the corporation and its
creditors, and upon the same rights, namely, the pro-rata distribution
of assets among its creditors, the effect is that the state insolvency laws
are suspended. The court said that undoubtedly this would be true if it
had appeared that the jurisdiction of the federal bankruptcy court had
been invoked, but since it appears that it was not, the question argued is
not presented for decision.
These earlier decisions are no longer being followed, and the courts
now hold that the state insolvency statutes are superseded whether the
federal bankruptcy statutes are invoked or not. In the Idaho case of
Capital Lumber Co. v. Saunders,12 the court points out the distinction
between proceedings under a general insolvency statute and one that
simply permits the assignment for the benefit of creditors. The decision
cites that of In re Seivers,13 in which the contention hinged upon the
question as to whether the national bankruptcy law suspended the voluntary assignment statutes of the state, and on this point the court said:
"Concerning these different contentions, it appears to me that
there is a substantial difference between a proceeding under a general insolvency statute and one under a statute permitting general
assignments. The one administers upon the estate of an insolvent
as a proceeding in the Courts, derives its potency from the law,
135 Wash. 161, 76 Pac. 934 (1904).

'87 N. J. Eq. 350, 100Adl. 167 (1916).
1226 Idaho 408, 143 Pac. 1178 (1914).
"91 Fed. 366 (D.C.Mo.E. D. 1899).
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winds up the estate judicially, and discharges the debtor. Such is
essentially a proceeding in bankruptcy, and such is undoubtedly
superseded by the act of Congress in question. * * * It results from
these views that, while proceedings under the insolvency laws, as
such, are now void whether proceedings in bankruptcy follow or
not, proceedings under the general assignment laws * * * or under
the common law deed of assignment, are not void or voidable, unless proceedings in bankruptcy are subsequently instituted." (Italics ours.)
In the leading case of In re Tarnowski,1 4 the discharge provisions
of the act were held to be severable, and the entire act was not suspended.
Tarnowski made a voluntary assignment under a state statute.similar to
the Colorado act for the benefit of creditors, and thereafter the estate was
administered according to the act and distribution made. The International Shoe Company filed its claim and received and accepted pro-rata
dividends. In due course, Tarnowski made application for a discharge
and the shoe company objected on the ground that the provision relating
to a discharge had been superseded by the National Bankruptcy Act.
The attorneys for the debtor argued that the shoe company, having
acquiesced in the proceedings, and having filed a claim and participated
in the dividends, is not in a position to object to a discharge because they
submitted to the jurisdiction of the court; that they may not enjoy the
benefits and privileges of the law and then escape its burdens by attacking
its validity. The court pointed out that the shoe company is not attacking any feature of the law under which the estate was administered, as up
to this point the statute is merely a regulation of voluntary assignment;
that anyone can assign his property to anyone else for any legitimate
purpose, and that the statute merely points out how distribution and
liquidation should be made. But the discharge of a debtor is quite
another thing. "The discharge of a bankrupt from his debts constitutes
the very essence of a bankrupt law." Since the discharge provision has
been superseded by the Bankruptcy Act, it has no force, and the creditor
may object to the discharge even though he filed his claim and accepted
the dividend.
The United States Supreme Court had this question before it in
1929 in the case of International Shoe Co. v. Pinkus,15 in which the
question arose under the state act, although the federal bankruptcy act
had not been invoked. The court held the state act void, saying:
"Congress did not intend to give insolvent debtors seeking
discharge, or their creditors seeking to collect claims, choice between
"191 Wis. 279, 210 N. W. 836, 49 A. L. R. 686 (1926).
15278 U. S. 261, 49 S. Ct. 108, 73 L. ed. 318 (1929).

108 U. S. 379, 2 S. Ct. 765, 27 L. ed. 760 (1883).

See also Boese v. King,
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the relief provided by the Bankruptcy Act and that specified in
state insolvency laws. States may not pass or enforce laws to interfere with or complement the bankruptcy act or to provide additionalor auxiliary regulations." (Italics ours.)

In view of the above decision of the United States Supreme Court,
the question has arisen whether the state statutes which do not provide
for a discharge are likewise superseded. Such a case arose in 1932, Hammond v. Lyon Realty Company.1- The court discusses at some length
the decision in InternationalShoe Co. v. Pinkus, supra, and other cases,
and then says:
"It was not decided in either of these cases that there might
not be a state insolvent law that would be superseded by the National Bankruptcy Act, although not providing for the discharge
of the indebtedness. * * * Thus it was expressly said in International Shoe Co. vs. Pinkus: 'States may not pass or enforce laws to
interfere with or complement the Bankruptcy Act or to provide
additional or auxiliary regulations.' It follows that not only those
state laws which purport to cover the whole field of insolvency administration are superseded by the national bankruptcy law, but all
other state laws to the extent that they hamper or restrict its proper
operation."
(Italics ours.)
The evolution of the judicial process continued until it finally
reached the point where all state statutes on the subject seem to be suspended whether or not they provide for the discharge of the debtor. This
was decided in our own circuit by Judge Phillips in the case of First
National Bank of Albuquerque v. Robinson.1 7 The case arose under a
New Mexico statute which simply provided for an assignment for benefit
of creditors, but which did not provide for a discharge of the debtor.
The court analyzed the state law and reached the conclusion that it is
essentially an insolvency act and covers substantially the same field as the
National Bankruptcy Act. While the New Mexico act does not make
express provision for the discharge of the debtor, it does provide for the
distribution of its assets and the dissolution of the corporation. * * *
The court then makes a statement which clearly goes much further than
any previous decision on the subject, when it said:
"An express provision for a discharge is not an essential element of an insolvency law." (Italics ours.)
The court then lays down this rule, which seems to go the limit
in so far as state statutes are concerned:
1-59 F. (2d) 592 (C. C. A. 4th, 1932).
107 F. (2d) 50 (C. C. A. 10th, 1939).

DICTA

279

"By virtue of the constitutional authority of Congress to
enact a uniform system of bankruptcy, the national bankruptcy
act is paramount and superior to all state laws upon the subject,
and all state insolvency laws are suspended in so far as they relate
to the same subject-matter and affect the same persons as the National Bankruptcy Act."
(Italics ours.)
This same principle has been applied and invoked on subjects other
than bankruptcy."' In 1939, Pennsylvania passed an Alien Registration
Act requiring all aliens to register each year, carry their cards with them
at all times and so on and provided a penalty for failure to comply with
the act. In 1940, Congress passed a Federal Registration Act for aliens.
A test case was brought to determine the validity of the state act. In a
well reasoned and well written opinion by Justice Hugo Black, the court
pointed out that the basic subject of the state and federal laws is identical
-registration of aliens as a distinct group; and that "the only question
is whether the state act is in abeyance or whether the state and federal
government have concurrent jurisdiction to register aliens * * *."
The court holds, first, that the Constitution of the United States
is the supreme law of the land; that the Constitution gives Congress the
power to regulate foreign affairs, and that the responsibility of a government toward an alien is part of that duty and power. "Consequently,"
said the court, "the regulation of aliens is so intimately blended and intertwined with responsibilities of national government that where it acts,
and the state also acts on the same subject, 'the act of Congress * * * is
supreme; and the law of the state, though enacted in the exercise of pow.ers not controverted, must yield to it.' " (Italics ours.)
The court
then lays down the following rule:
"And where the federal government, in the exercise of its
superior authority in this field, has enacted a complete scheme of
regulation and has therein provided a standard for the registration
of aliens, states cannot, inconsistently with the purpose of Congress,
conflict or interfere with, curtail or complement, the federal law, or
enforce additional or auxiliary regulations."
The decision of InternationalShoe Co. v. Pinhus, supra, is cited in
support of this statement.
It would appear that if the words "administration of the estates of
bankrupts" were substituted in the above quotation for the words "registration of aliens," we would thereby have what is probably the present
law upon the subject in this country.
There are some courts which cannot understand why the state laws
'Hines v. Davidowitz, 61 S. Ct. 399 (decided Jan. 20, 1941).
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cannot be enforced or proceeded under so long as the federal bankruptcy
law is not invoked. The answer is that Congress has the power to legislate upon the subject matter of bankruptcies. It has not always done
so. 19 During such periods, when no federal act was in force, state acts
upon the subject were perfectly valid. It is not the right of Congress to
establish these laws, but their actual establishment, which causes the state
statutes to become inoperative.2 ° The proposition, therefore, that the
state act is suspended or held in abeyance by the federal act is as clear upon
authority as it'is upon logic.
In the McKelvy case2' the Colorado Assignment Act itself was not
involved, much less its validity, since that case involved only a common
law assignment.

Therefore the language of the court that "the results

might have been different" if the debtor had proceeded under the statutory assignment was pure dictum and cannot be taken as indicating in any

way that in a case directly involving the validity of the state act, our
Supreme Court would not follow the general line of authorities.

Hamlet J. Barry, Jr., Writes of

Current Events of
Bench and Bar
Greater Number of Government Vehicles Boosts Tort Claims
Since the defense effort has been under way there has been a twenty
per cent increase in tort claims involving government-owned vehicles.
Because of all these claims it is predicted that the pending tort claim bill
will be speedily passed. This bill provides that claims for $7,500 or less
will be adjudicated in the federal courts. Claims of a greater amount
will still have to be considered by the congressional claims committees.
Lawyers Are Urged to Learn Latin-American Laws

Roy Vallance, secretary general of the Inter-American Bar Association, in a recent address recommended that lawyers and law students
familiarize themselves with the legal institutions of the Pan-American
countries. Mr. Vallance also suggested that attempts should be made to
harmonize and unify the commercial law of the Americas, and that unless
the lawyers make this effort the increasing trade with South America will
be hampered in its growth.
'"Supra, note 7.
'Sturges v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat. 122, 4 L. ed. 529 (1819).
'Supra, note 1.

